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PAUL TO JEREMIAH: CALHOUN’S  
ABANDONMENT OF NATIONALISM 
K.R. Constantine Gutzman* 
 
 The name “John C. Calhoun” is associated with a state-centered 
reading of the American Constitution of 1788. However, for the first 
fifteen years of his political career, Calhoun stood in the front rank of 
nationalist politicians. Over the course of his career, Calhoun aban-
doned nationalism for an emphasis upon states’ rights, then ulti-
mately became an advocate of Southern regionalism. 
 This article will describe the series of events that launched John 
C. Calhoun down the path from apostle of nationalism to increasingly 
angry prophet (not to say advocate) of disunion. 
 
THE BIG PICTURE 
 Calhoun’s political views, like those of many politicians of his 
generation, were formed by classical education in light of the War of 
1812.1 Having taken the lead in prompting Congress to declare war 
in that fateful year, Calhoun emerged from his nation’s travails con-
vinc-ed that American honor, prestige, and devotion to principle had 
been vindicated. However, the “Corrupt Bargain” leading to John 
Quincy Adams’s elevation to the presidency and Henry Clay’s ap-
pointment as secretary of state in 1825 was the first in a series of 
events that convinced Calhoun that something was rotten in the 
American polity. Seeing corruption in the general outline of the Ad-
                                                     
*K.R. Constantine Gutzman is assistant professor of history at Western Con-
necticut State University. 
1See, e.g., Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Lib-
er-al America, 1790–1820 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1987). 
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ams-Clay policy, Calhoun began formulating his classic defense of 
states’ rights. 
 Yet, many scholars trace the shift in Calhoun’s constitutional 
stance to a reappraisal of his political prospects. South Carolina, they 
say, had abandoned its traditional nationalism in favor of an extreme 
localism, and Calhoun merely flapped like a shirt in the breeze. 
Therefore, before turning to an exploration of the reason for his 
change of posture, this essay first traces Calhoun’s early political ca-
reer, briefly exploring episodes in which the young Carolinian self-
consciously bucked public opinion and set himself apart from the 
caricatures of him that now dominate the historiography. His under-
standing of himself as a man of principle, evident from his first ap-
pearance on the public stage, is the main evidence that his (mainly 
partisan) detractors have Calhoun wrong. 
 Within a few years of 1825, the Nullification Crisis helped estab-
lish the permanent radicalization of a certain portion of South Caro-
lina’s ruling elite. The constitutional arguments that Calhoun and his 
followers made then eventually formed the basis of Confederate 
constitutionalism.2 Thus, Calhoun’s decision to devote himself to 
defensive efforts on behalf of the South during that earlier period 
contributed to the coming of the war in 1861. 
 
CALHOUN’S EARLY POLITICAL CAREER 
 Young Calhoun’s was a Calvinist mind. In a letter to his cousin, 
Calhoun wrote that the “Yankees” he had encountered at Yale “are 
certainly more penurious, more contracted in their sentiments, and 
less social, than the Carolinians. But as to morality we must yield.”3 
Calhoun, in his twenties, made a point of noticing the moral climate 
wherever he went. The earnest seriousness that marked Calhoun in 
the prime of his political career, some thirty years later in the Jack-
sonian period, was already stamped clearly on his character in the 
years of Virginia’s preeminence. In the tradition of his father, he 
                                                     
2See Marshall DeRosa, The Confederate Constitution: An Inquiry into Ameri-
can Constitutionalism (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1991), pp. 
18–37. 
3Calhoun to Andrew Pickens, Jr., May 23, 1803, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1959), vol. 1, pp. 9–
10. 
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noted, “It is laid down as a maxim of prudence by many philoso-
phers, that we ought always to make our pleasure act in subordina-
tion to our duties and obligations.”4 
 Along with his personal abstemiousness and quest to achieve 
stoic self-control, Calhoun nurtured a strong patriotism first evident 
after the H.M.S. Leopard attacked the American ship Chesapeake 
on June 22, 1807.5 The Leopard’s aim was to force the Chesapeake 
to submit to a search for British deserters (and thus, in all probabil-
ity, to the impressment of some of its crew). When the Chesapeake 
did not yield, the Leopard resorted to force, an “act of war.”6 The 
result: continental outrage from which Pendleton, South Carolina, 
was not immune. The torrent of controversy that swept the country 
even had President Jefferson thinking of war. 
 One little-noted effect of the Chesapeake-Leopard incident was 
the appearance on the public stage of a figure who, for forty years to 
come, would be a leading Anglophobe force in American politics. 
When the large public meeting in Pendleton adjourned on August 3, 
1807, Calhoun’s neighbors were stunned at his debut on the public 
stage.7 Young John had taken the lead in drafting the convocation’s 
statement, which said, in part, 
We are urged by the torrent of our feelings, to give vent 
to an indignation deep and universal. Long Silence illy 
becomes those in whom the Sovereignty of the country 
ultimately resides. . . ; it would disgrace our character 
Abroad, and exhibit us a degenerate and pusillanimous 
people, instead of a nation glorying in its Independence, 
united by a common and enthusiastic Patriotism; and 
resolute, by a joint exertion of strength, to maintain the 
united and indivisible interest of our common country.8 
                                                     
4Calhoun to Andrew Pickens, Jr., June 25, 1805, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn, vol. 1, pp. 13–14. 
5This account is based on Dumas Malone, “The Chesapeake Affair,” chap. 
23 in Jefferson the President, Second Term, 1805–1809 (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1974), pp. 415–38. 
6Malone, Jefferson the President, p. 421. 
7Irving H. Bartlett, John C. Calhoun: A Biography (New York: W.W. Nor-
ton, 1993), p. 57. 
8Calhoun, “Resolutions on the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair,” August 3, 
1807, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 34–35. 
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The notion that national virility—the willingness to pursue a capacity 
for self-defense—was an essential component of republican virtue 
would be a prominent part of Calhoun’s thought throughout his career. 
 Election to the state legislature was young Calhoun’s reward. His 
most notable achievement as a state representative was chairing the 
committee which wrote universal white manhood suffrage into the 
state’s new constitution.9 That John C. Calhoun played the leading 
role in this provision’s adoption challenges some of the leading in-
terpretations of his career. Beginning with Hermann E. von Holst’s 
1899 biography, many historians have endeavored to fit Calhoun’s 
personality and career into some small niche; for von Holst, the one 
concept that explained Calhoun’s career after 1830 was slavery.10 
The most eminent current advocate of such monothematic theses, 
William W. Freehling, has repeatedly characterized Calhoun as a 
committed “elitist,” each time basing his analysis on Calhoun’s 
systematic works of political philosophy, which were written in the 
last decade of the statesman’s life and published posthumously.11 
Attention to Calhoun’s career before 1830 yields another view.12 
                                                     
9John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union: A Biography (Ba-
ton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), p. 30. 
10Edward E. von Holst, John C. Calhoun (New York: Chelsea House, 
1980). 
11William W. Freehling, “Spoilsmen and Interests in the Thought and Ca-
reer of John C. Calhoun,” Journal of American History 52 (1965), pp. 25–
42; William W. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Contro-
versy in South Carolina, 1816–1836 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1965); and William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at 
Bay, 1776–1854 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). In the first 
and third of these works, Freehling mentions the enactment of universal 
white manhood suffrage in South Carolina, but in each case omits Cal-
houn’s role in its adoption. See Freehling, “Spoilsmen and Interests in the 
Thought and Career of John C. Calhoun,” passim; The Road to Disunion, 
p. 591. 
12While historians have long noted the obvious waning of Calhoun’s na-
tionalism between 1817 and 1832, they have never pinned down the date or 
prox-imate cause of its diminution. For the latest example of a work which 
avoids this issue, see Lacy K. Ford, Jr., “Inventing the Concurrent Majority: 
Madison, Calhoun, and the Problem of Majoritarianism in American Politi-
cal Thought,” Journal of Southern History 60, no. 1 (February 1994), pp. 
19–58. 
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 In 1811, during his first congressional term, Calhoun wrote to a 
friend about his posture toward Carolina political opponents. They 
might attempt to undercut him, he said, but he would not relent in 
matters of principle: 
All know that in the short time I have been in public ser-
vice . . . I often advocated unpo[p]ular questions. . . . I do 
trust that neither their censure, [n]or that of the whole 
com-munity itself will ever drive me from the path of 
duty. I love just renown; but, to me undeserved popular-
ity ha[s] no charms.13 
 Calhoun’s first major endeavor in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives was his presentation of a Foreign Relations Committee report 
on the state of British-American relations.14 As the number two man 
on the committee, Calhoun played the dominant role in drafting the 
report, which rang with the same stout republican rhetoric as had the 
Pendleton remonstrance on the Chesapeake-Leopard affair four 
years earlier. “We must now tamely & quietly submit,” the reporter 
has Calhoun declaring, 
or, we must resist, by those means which God has placed 
within our reach. Your committee would not cast a 
shade over the American name, by the expression of a 
doubt which branch of this alternative will be embraced. . . 
. [T]he national character . . . should be vindicated. 
As if the rhetoric of “the committee” had not been persuasive 
enough, Calhoun closed by stating 
That proud spirit of liberty & independence, which sus-
tain-ed our fathers in the successful assertion of their 
rights . . . is not yet sunk: The patriotic fire of the Revo-
lution still burns in the American breast with a holy & 
unextinguishable flame. . . . The sovereignty and inde-
pendence of these states, purchased and sanctified by the 
blood of our fathers, from whom we received them, not 
for ourselves only, but as the inheritance of posterity, are 
deliberately and systematically violated.15 
                                                     
13Calhoun to Dr. James MacBride, September 10, 1811, The Papers of John 
C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 61–62. 
14“Report on Relations with Great Britain,” November 29, 1811, The Papers 
of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 63–69. 
15“Report on Relations with Great Britain,” pp. 67–68. 
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In the fiery young congressman’s speech, both the blood of the fa-
thers and the rape of their legacy cried out for expiation.16 In order 
to show themselves worthy of their sires, he said, this generation 
must make war. President James Madison, it seems, had a legislative 
advocate for his war-related measures whose enthusiasm for the 
American effort would soon outstrip his own. 
 State sovereignty would become a recurrent theme in Calhoun’s 
thought; in fact, his name has become nearly synonymous with the 
concept. Yet, in the period 1811–1817, Calhoun was in the broad 
mid-dle on this question. The so-called “Old Republicans” whose 
cause was the Tenth Amendment plain and simple viewed him as a 
consolidationist.17 The Old Republicans simply misread him. 
 Calhoun enunciated his lifelong theory of federal-state relations 
while in the House of Representatives. On December 5, 1811, during 
his first year in Congress, Calhoun said, “it is the theory of our gov-
ernment . . . that liberty can only exist in a division of the sovereign 
power.”18 Where he parted company with such colleagues as John 
Randolph was in the latter’s denial that the federal government had 
any capacity for conducting an assertive foreign policy. In response 
to one of Randolph’s harangues, Calhoun is reported to have said 
It is not for the human tongue to instil the sense of inde-
pendence and honor. . . . If [Randolph] means that this 
House ought at this stage of the proceeding, or any 
other, to enumerate such violations of our rights, as we 
                                                     
16This was a recurrent theme. See “Speech on the Albany Petition for Re-
peal of the Embargo,” May 6, 1812, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 
1, pp. 102–8; and, especially, “Speech on the Military Situation,” October 
25, 1814, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 254–59. In the latter, 
he argues that “It is the war of the Revolution revived—we are again strug-
gling for our liberty and independence.” 
17On the “Old Republicans,” see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Keepers of 
the Jeffersonian Conscience,” chap. 3 in The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1948), pp. 18–29; and Norman Risjord, The Old Republicans: 
Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1965). On Calhoun’s tempestuous relationship with them, 
and especially with John Randolph of Roanoke, see The Papers of John C. 
Calhoun, vol. 1. 
18“Speech on the Apportionment Bill,” December 5, 1811, The Papers of John 
C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 71–74. 
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are willing to contend for, he prescribes a course, which 
neither good sense [n]or the usage of nations warrants. 
When we contend, let us contend for all our rights; the 
doubtful and the certain; the unimportant and essential.19 
When Randolph responded that the nation would not willingly pay 
for war on the scale that Calhoun’s policy must entail, Calhoun coun-
tered, “Sir, I here enter my solemn protest against this low and ‘cal-
culating avarice’ entering this hall of legislation. . . . True courage 
regards only the cause . . . and . . . despises the pain of war.”20 
 The personal animosity between Randolph and Calhoun is evident 
here; Randolph’s partisan characterizations of Calhoun’s policy ap-
parently created the myth of a difference between the early “nation-
alist” Calhoun and the later advocate of states’ rights.21 Also evident, 
though, is Calhoun’s view of public virtue, which involves willing-
ness to sacrifice oneself and to serve in the military.22 
 That Randolph grew to resent Calhoun should not surprise, for 
Calhoun employed the most derogatory rhetoric in their encounters. 
One interesting exchange involved the famous “Principles of ’98,” 
which were the touchstone of the Old Republicans, and which would 
one day become the key to Calhoun’s mature political theory. In an 
1813 debate over an administration request for increased manpower, 
Randolph explicitly based his opposition on the Principles of ’98. They 
could be summarized, the Virginian said, in two principles: opposi-
tion to the general government in favor of the states, and opposition 
to the general government in contests with individuals. He closed 
                                                     
19“Speech on the Report of the Foreign Relations Committee,” December 
12, 1811, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 75–85. 
20The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 75–85. 
21The notion of a radical divergence between early and late Calhoun can be 
seen in many surveys of the Jacksonian era, such as Edward Pessen, Jack-
sonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1985), and in some of the Calhoun biographies, such as Ge-
rald Capers, John C. Calhoun: Opportunist—A Reappraisal (Gainesville: 
University of Florida Press, 1960). 
22Calhoun repeated this point in his “Second Speech on the Military Acad-
emies Bill,” January 3, 1816, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 
289–90. For Calhoun’s willingness to serve, see Calhoun to Patrick Noble, 
March 22, 1812, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 95–96. 
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his speech with an encomium to George Washington. 
 The South Carolinian heaped scorn upon the former House ma-
jority leader. Washington’s “whole life,” Calhoun said, “indicated 
the strongest leaning on the side of the government of his country,” 
so Randolph was being wildly inconsistent. Additionally, Calhoun 
said that if the Principles of ’98 were as Randolph characterized 
them, Randolph’s adherence to them disqualified him from any po-
sition in the Executive. “Trust the government to those who are hos-
tile to it! Who prefer their own interest and rights, to its interest and 
rights!” The opposition had “the love of present ease and enjoyment, 
the love of gain, and party zeal” on its side. “These,” he said, “con-
stitute part of the weakness of our nature.” In other words, the oppo-
sition’s motives ran counter to those of the virtuous; the task of the 
majority was “to elevate the minds of the people, and to call up all of 
those qualities by which present sacrifices are made to secure future 
good.”23 
 Calhoun was convinced that his was the more virtuous policy, 
and he equated it with that of “our government and country.” While the 
Old Republicans’ siren song of frugal government might continue, 
1813 found Calhoun sure his side would prevail. Even as the war went 
badly, he expressed confidence that the people and their government 
would stay the course: “The intelligence, the virtue and the tone of 
publick sentiment are too great in this country to permit its freedom 
to be destroied by either domestick or foreign foes.”24 
 The war, we must understand, had positive effects beyond the 
mere maintenance of national self-respect. For instance, Calhoun was 
extremely pleased with the war’s collateral economic effect: promo-
tion of domestic industry. He told the House, 
We must . . . rejoice at the acquisition of those national 
qualities necessary to meet the vicissitude of war when 
                                                     
23“Speech on the Bill for an Additional Military Force,” January 14, 1813, 
The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 150–61. 
24Calhoun to Dr. James Macbride, June 23, 1813, The Papers of John C. 
Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 177–78. The equation of his position with that of “the 
country,” of his views with those of Americans generally, is found 
throughout the extant correspondence from the war years. This marks Cal-
houn as a typical Jeffersonian. See K.R. Constantine Gutzman, “Old Do-
minion, New Republic: Making Virginia Republican, 1776–1840” (Ph.D. 
diss., University of Virginia, 1999), chap. 5. 
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made unavoidable. Connected with this subject, I rejoice 
to behold the amazing growth of our manufacturing in-
terest. . . . It will more than indemnify the country for all 
of its losses. I believe no country . . . can acquire a state 
of great and permanent wealth, without the aid of manu-
factories.25 
In the end, Calhoun considered the war a “complete success.” He 
was proud to be “of a party which drew the sword on [impressment], 
and succeeded in the contest.” 26 More important than the end of im-
pressment—which, objectively, is difficult to attribute to the Ameri-
can war effort—even more important than the marshalling of Ameri-
can industrial resources, was the national feeling the war had 
aroused: 
Now, we see everywhere a nationality of feeling; we 
hear sentiments from every part of the House in favor of 
union, and against a sectional spirit. What had produced 
this change? The glory acquired by the late war, and the 
prosperity which had followed it.27 
 Calhoun’s war aims obviously had been different from those of 
the Madison administration, for whom the War of 1812 represented 
a monstrous debacle.28 The War Hawk from Pendleton had been less 
concerned with such geostrategic goals as the acquisition of Cana-
dian territory than with establishing his country’s maturity and inde-
pendence. In that limited sense, his opinion that the war had been a 
success was shared by large numbers of his countrymen. 
 With the war’s end, Calhoun, like his contemporaries, was free 
to ruminate on the nature of the Union and its peacetime political 
economy. Picking up a theme he had enunciated in his 1811 debate 
                                                     
25“Speech on the Loan Bill,” February 25, 1814, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn, vol. 1, p. 238. 
26“Speech on the Results of the War,” February 27, 1815, The Papers of 
John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, p. 282. 
27“First Speech on the Military Academies Bill,” January 2, 1816, The Pa-
pers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, p. 288. 
28See J.C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare 
in the Early American Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1983); and Ralph Ketcham, James Madison: A Biography (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1970). 
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with Randolph, Calhoun argued that the strictly limited delegation 
of power to the center was ideal, giving Congress all powers that 
were necessary, but none that would be pernicious.29 As to political 
economy, Calhoun remained at loggerheads with the Old Republicans. 
The government’s wartime financial system should be retained, he 
asserted, and even strengthened by the addition of a new Bank of 
the United States, until a system of fortifications and internal com-
munications (to be financed with assistance from Calhoun’s Bonus 
Bill) was completed. This, he declared, would render the United 
States impervious to likely British depredations.30 Besides that, the 
tariff should provide some minor protection for “certain manufac-
tures in cotton and woolens” to fund those programs.31 
 In 1816, Calhoun had been reelected to the House only after fac-
ing down substantial opposition in his district to his vote in support 
of a congressional pay raise.32 Other congressmen had advised him 
to downplay his vociferous support for the measure, or even to 
change his position. However, to have done so would have been un-
true both to Calhoun’s image in his district, where he was seen as 
“republican virtue incarnate,”33 and to his self-image as a man who 
was uninterested in being popular without being right. The measure, 
in Calhoun’s opinion, would keep higher quality men in the House 
for more than one or two terms, which made it a “highly republican” 
measure.34 While only one-third of the sitting House members were 
reelected, Calhoun, who had publicly defended his vote, was among 
them. His colleagues rescinded the pay raise shortly thereafter, but 
                                                     
29The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, p. 311. 
30“Speech on the Additional Revenue Report,” January 20, 1816, The Pa-
pers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 314–15, and “Speech on the Revenue 
Bill,” January 31, 1816, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1. For South 
Carolinians’ postwar willingness to sacrifice their personal interests to the 
common good of the United States, see Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 
pp. 91–96. 
31“Speech on Compensation of Members,” March 8, 1816, The Papers of 
John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 343–45. 
32Calhoun to Alex J. Dallas, June 15, 1816, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, 
vol. 1, pp. 361–62. 
33Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union, p. 55. 
34“Speech on the Compensation of Members,” March 8, 1816, The Papers 
of John C. Calhoun, vol. 1, pp. 343–45. 
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not before even old opponents commended Calhoun’s disinterested 
(virtuous) stand.35 
 President Madison’s veto of Calhoun’s Bonus Bill seems to have 
negated the best opportunity for any antebellum Congress to put all 
sections of the country on convergent paths of economic develop-
ment. For Calhoun, the Bonus Bill promised to put off the advent of 
parochial politics; he thought a centrally directed program of inter-
nal im-provements could strengthen the country militarily and, at the 
same time, counteract the centrifugal tendencies so much in evidence 
during the war.36 
 
CALHOUN IN THE MONROE CABINET 
 Calhoun’s political economy changed not a whit during his ten-
ure as President James Monroe’s Secretary of War. Serving the Vir-
ginian, whom he much admired (and would admire ever after), Cal-
houn did what he could to ensure that the new American republic 
would enter any future conflict with Great Britain—he thought there 
would be another, probably sooner rather than later—in a state of 
high preparedness. The fortifications and transportation network he 
had endorsed as the young lion from South Carolina were now his 
personal responsibility, and Secretary Calhoun made the most of the 
opportunity.37 
 Yet, although he was devoted to the task of ensuring that Ameri-
cans guarded their fathers’ legacy militarily, he continued to insist 
that the Constitution be read correctly. In an 1824 letter to his Com-
mander-in-Chief, Calhoun explained his long-held position on inter-
nal improvements. The Constitution did not empower the federal 
                                                     
35Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union, p. 55. Calhoun long re-
mained convinced that raising the pay of congressmen was good policy. 
See Calhoun to John G. Jackson, March 31, 1818, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn, vol. 2, pp. 216–17. 
36John L. Larson, “‘Bind the Republic Together’: The National Union and 
the Struggle for a System of Internal Improvements,” Journal of American 
History 74, no. 2 (September 1987), pp. 363–87. 
37Congressman Calhoun had said, “Let us conquer space.” Secretary of 
War Calhoun’s army did so. He even mounted a horse and scouted out a 
route for the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal himself. See The Papers of John 
C. Calhoun, vol. 9, pp. xliv, xlvi–xlvii. 
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govern-ment to engage in intrastate internal improvements (for ex-
ample, the building of roads), so, he argued, those must be left to the 
states. The general government should support internal improve-
ments “which may bind all the parts together and the whole with the 
centre.”38 
 The most important controversy of the Monroe administration 
concerned Missouri’s admission to the Union. When a New York 
congressman proposed an amendment denying Missouri the right to 
decide for itself whether it would have slavery, Monroe had a ready 
explanation: Northern leaders, hungry for power after Virginia’s long 
domination, wanted a party issue.39 
 The controversy adversely affected Union sentiment in the South 
and West. Calhoun prided himself on his role in fostering Union feel-
ing; to him, such adverse sentiment was so bad a result that an imme-
diate end to the controversy was of paramount importance.40 Thus, 
from Calhoun, who shared Monroe’s appraisal,41 came only modera-
tion. 
 In fact, Calhoun foresaw that this issue might be fatal to the Union, 
for continued controversy might convince the slave-holding states 
that “it [was] the intention of the other States gradually to undermine 
their property in their slaves and that a disunion [was] the only means 
to avert the evil.”42 His disapproval of hothead behavior on both 
sides was evident when he wrote to his kinsman, John Ewing Col-
houn, 
I still hope, that Missouri will be admitted before the end 
of the session; and that a question, which has so deeply 
agitated this country will be settled forever. Both sides 
                                                     
38Calhoun to James Monroe, December 3, 1824, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn,vol. 9, pp. 421–29. 
39George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1952), p. 229. 
40Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, June 1, 1820, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn, vol. 4, pp. 164–65. 
41Calhoun to Samuel Ingham, December 17, 1820, The Papers of John C. 
Calhoun, vol. 4, pp. 500–2. 
42Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, August 12, 1820, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn, vol. 4, pp. 327–28, emphasis in original. 
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have moderated very much.43 
 In the wake of the Missouri controversy, Calhoun believed that 
the issue had been put to rest permanently, and he insisted that those 
Southerners who saw the beginning of a great sectional conflict were 
mistaken. Few Northerners desired such a struggle, and they were 
geographically concentrated. A sectional orientation would be coun-
terproductive for the South, he knew, for if the North encountered 
systematic sectional opposition, “they must from necessity resort to a 
similar opposition to us. Our true system is to . . . advance the general 
interest.” Yet, he feared some Southerners’ continued agitation.44 The 
Missouri controversy thus left Calhoun firmly in the Union camp. 
The federal Constitution, understood as federal rather than national, 
had his devoted support then, as it would throughout his career. 
 
CALHOUN’S PRESIDENTIAL PROSPECTS 
 From our vantage point, it seems clear that Calhoun never had a 
serious chance of election to the presidency in 1824, but his perspective 
was somewhat different. Of the major candidates, only he and Henry 
Clay had gone on record in support of internal improvements, and, 
as Calhoun wrote to his friend and political operative Virgil Maxcy, 
the West could be expected to support internal improvements, while 
his election promised to marshal the support of recalcitrant South-
erners.45 Calhoun’s appeal was straightforward: the memory of his 
role in the much-celebrated War of 1812, coupled with his promise 
of internal improvements and his reputation as a proper republican, 
seemed to Calhoun to augur success. 
 The South Carolina legislature’s nomination of a different favorite 
son, though, was a serious blow to Calhoun’s candidacy, leaving him 
reliant on the outcome in the Pennsylvania legislature. Subsequently, 
Calhoun was shocked when the growing Jackson phenomenon car-
ried the general to victory in Pennsylvania. As to the balance of the 
                                                     
43Calhoun to John Ewing Colhoun, January 8, 1821, The Papers of John C. 
Calhoun, vol. 4, pp. 540–41. 
44Calhoun to Charles Trist, October 26, 1820, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn, vol. 4, pp. 412–14. 
45Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, September 17, 1823, The Papers of John C. 
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campaign, he told friends elsewhere to remember that the means of 
elevation were as important as the elevation itself.46 There would be 
no perseverance in hope of winning in the House after an Electoral 
College deadlock. 
 Bowing to the inevitable, Calhoun withdrew from the five-man 
contest and set his sights on the number two office. If the caucus sys-
tem were destroyed, the vice presidency would acquire its own lus-
tre; he would accept it in that event, but he would not accept it as a 
caucus nominee, thus a party creature.47 His main goals were the 
perpetuation of the Monroe administration’s policies48 and the defeat 
of the caucus system in the person of Georgia’s William Crawford, 
the Secretary of the Treasury and nominee of the Republican con-
gressional caucus.49 
 Since he had long tormented their champion, John Randolph, the 
states’ rights school in Virginia was skeptical of elevating Calhoun to 
the vice presidency. He seemed to them the very archetype of con-
solidationism, a sort of Federalist constitutionalist in Republican 
guise. In the face of such an important opposition element, the young 
Carolinian could be sanguine neither about his chances in 1824 nor 
about his future prospects: in a word, no Southerner could win the 
presiden-cy without the support of Virginia. Calhoun therefore ex-
plained his career to a member of that Richmond clique, Robert S. 
Garnett. 
If there is one part of the Constitution, which I most ad-
mire, it is the distribution of power between the State and 
General government[s]. It is the only portion, that is 
novel and peculiar . . . and I consider it to be the greatest 
improvement, which has been made in the science of 
government, after the division of power into Legislative, 
Executive and judicial. 
In such a large area as the United States, he pointed out, a govern-
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ment wholly national, if it were effective, would possess such patron-
age and power that it must eventuate in tyranny.50 
 In obvious reference to his feud with Randolph, Calhoun told Gar-
nett that he did not believe it was proper merely to oppose the gen-
eral government in every case of friction, for to do so would surely 
bring the rights of the states into disrepute. Rather, the intended form 
of federalism, the carefully considered allocation of powers to the 
general government and retention of the residuum by the states, was 
Calhoun’s lodestar. The implication is clear: Randolph was so opposed 
to the central government’s exercise of power that he had strayed from 
the people’s will as expressed in the ratification process. Virginians 
had been misled, for Calhoun had always been a proponent of states’ 
rights—states’ rights properly understood, that is.51 
 Calhoun was certain from an early date that Crawford would be 
defeated.52 Also apparent was that the South Carolinian would be 
elected vice president. What he, like his fellow citizens, did not 
know, though, was who would succeed Monroe in the chief magis-
tracy. None of the candidates won an Electoral College majority, so 
the top three vote-getters went into a runoff in the U.S. House of 
Representatives. 
 Speaker of the House Henry Clay had placed fourth, behind 
Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and Crawford, in that order. Each 
state’s delegation had one vote. Rumors were in the air. The out-
come, the House’s elevation of Adams, came as an enormous sur-
prise to Calhoun. “Things,” he wrote to Virgil Maxcy, “have taken a 
strange turn. . . . I wish to see you much, so that you may clearly 
understand the present extraordinary and important crisis.”53 
 
“THE CORRUPT BARGAIN” 
                                                     
50Calhoun to Robert S. Garnett, July 3, 1824, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn, vol. 9, pp. 198–202. 
51The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 9, p. 199. 
52Calhoun to Joseph G. Swift, July 20, 1824, The Papers of John C. Cal-
houn, vol. 9, pp. 235–36. 
53Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, February 18, 1825, The Papers of John C. Cal-
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 In February of 1825, John C. Calhoun, as Secretary of War and 
vice president-elect, was a known commodity in American politics 
with several hard-earned traits of political character which would 
remain with him throughout his career. First, he was convinced that 
the United States must have a sufficient military to fend off potential 
aggressors. Great Britain could be expected periodically to renew its 
aggression against the former colonies, and vigilant republicans must 
be prepared. Second, he contended that the Constitution’s federalism 
must be respected, yielding neither to states’ rights extremism nor to 
the growing centripetal forces. Only the central government could 
perform the functions delegated to it, and it should perform only 
those. 
 A statesman, believed young Calhoun, should be disinterested. 
Monetary considerations must not drive his policy, and he must 
speak the truth to the public, heedless of whether he thought they 
would agree. Further, the proper American politician had to bear in 
mind that every liberty he enjoyed was part of his patrimony, and 
that he owed it to his fathers to pass on the legacy intact to his sons. 
 The War of 1812 had, as Calhoun saw it, established that his was 
the majority position. Americans had rejected the temptation to take 
the easy way out. Randolph had consistently confronted the public 
with the cost of Calhoun’s war policy, but the public had not been 
swayed. It had seen the conflict through to what Calhoun considered 
a gloriously successful conclusion. Whatever the Old Republicans 
might say, Americans were as selfless as Calhoun’s ideal statesman, 
and Calhoun was thrilled by the young republic’s progress. America 
was virtuous, and Calhoun was an American. 
 It was against this backdrop that Calhoun viewed the “Corrupt 
Bargain.”54 While we cannot know if an agreement by Speaker Clay, 
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a Kentuckian, to sway his fellows in exchange for the office of Sec-
retary of State was what led Kentucky to vote for Adams,55 we can 
chart the effects on the politics of John C. Calhoun. 
 Calhoun interpreted the ascension of Adams, followed as it im-
mediately was by Clay’s appointment as Secretary of State, as a 
gross departure from the example of James Monroe, whom Calhoun 
saw as a pillar of rectitude. Monroe would never have subverted the 
will of the people and bought the presidency. The outgoing presi-
dent had devoted his life to public service, and penury awaited him. 
This, from Calhoun’s point of view, was pristine (American) republi-
canism. As he had pointed out to Morse, the election should never 
have been thrown into the House in the first place, for disinterested 
(virtuous) also-rans would have withdrawn their names from consid-
eration before letting it come to that.56 
 Calhoun found himself in a situation unique in American history. 
Because of the collapse of the caucus system—although Crawford 
had been the caucus nominee, the majority of Republican congress-
men had not participated in the caucus—Calhoun had been elected 
on his own merits. This was the only time that a vice president could 
claim that he had been chosen specifically for the position, and was 
“vice president because he was important, not important because he 
was vice president.”57 President Adams never accepted that fact. 
 At this point, Calhoun began reconceiving national politics, hold-
ing the South the unsullied, republican region not implicated in the 
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might have been in the Cabinet far sooner. Of course, he had never before 
had a chance at the top job. 
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“Corrupt Bargain,” the federal government vulnerable to the manipu-
lations of self-interested spoilsmen, and the Adams administration 
representative of all that Calhoun opposed. Though the British threat 
was in abeyance, the vigilant republican found enemies at home. 
 
VICE PRESIDENT CALHOUN 
 Although the Constitution names the vice president as the presi-
dent of the Senate, vice presidents of the Virginia Dynasty era were 
essentially presidents in absentia. Therefore, the Senate had felt free 
to give its presiding officer—in the vice president’s accustomed ab-
sence, the president pro tempore, an officer elected by the Senate 
from among its membership—the power to appoint all committee 
members.58 Calhoun’s use of that power would play a part in the 
most interesting flap of the John Quincy Adams administration. 
 The vice presidency was then, as it is now, a position from which 
it was difficult for an ambitious man to keep himself in the public 
eye. Calhoun’s strategy was to remind people of his wartime contri-
butions and to lament the results of the recent election. In a May 27, 
1825, speech near Pendleton, Calhoun reminded listeners that, as a 
young man, he had seen that the United States were “unprepared” for 
war—a war that nonetheless had to be fought. With the war’s suc-
cessful conclusion, he had not been among those on whom its ex-
perience was lost: he had supported (at the least) the Monroe-era pol-
icy of military preparation. In conclusion, Calhoun opined that the 
cornerstone of the American political system was office-holders’ re-
sponsibility to the people “through frequent elections fairly con-
ducted.” This, he said, explained his early withdrawal from the recent 
presidential campaign.59 That this distinguished Calhoun from Ad-
ams and Clay was clear. 
 With the passing of 1825, Calhoun became convinced that Ad-
ams would lose in 1828; his deal with Clay would not be rewarded.60 
Not everyone shared his view, however, and since Calhoun held the 
highest office of any administration opponent, he suffered the parti-
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san scrutiny of the administration press. Ironically, the administra-
tion’s leading claim was that the Senate president was too indulgent 
of John Randolph’s meandering discourse. 
 On March 30, 1826, Randolph had (typically) moved to table some 
pending legislation. Nothing could have been more common. New 
Jersey Senator Mahlon Dickerson sought to speak on the motion, but 
Calhoun, presiding, refused permission. Randolph then spoke for a 
half hour on his motion. When the Virginian had finished, Dickerson 
again claimed the floor, but Calhoun again refused to grant him per-
mission. Instead, Calhoun spoke at length on the powers of the pre-
siding officer.61 
 As the matter became an issue of political gossip, Calhoun felt it 
necessary to justify his behavior. The speech in which he did so be-
gan with the assertion that the Senate should delegate no authority to 
the chair which it could exercise itself, for the vice president was nei-
ther of the senators’ number nor responsible to them. The rules of the 
Senate under which he claimed to have acted were as follows: 
Senate Rule 6: When a member shall be called to order, 
he shall sit down, until the President shall have deter-
mined whether he is in order or not; and every question 
of order shall be decided by the President, without de-
bate; but if there be a doubt in his mind, he may call for 
the sense of the Senate. 
Senate Rule 7: If the member be called to order, for 
words spoken, the exceptionable words shall immediately 
be taken down, in writing, that the President may be bet-
ter enabled to judge of the matter. 
He said that, after much consideration, he had decided that these two 
rules left it to members to call senators to order; the presiding offi-
cer’s was “an appellate power only,” which was a wise allocation of 
authority. As his was an odd relationship to the Senate, Calhoun read 
his writ strictly. He begged the Senate’s indulgence and resumed his 
seat.62 
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 Meanwhile, a storm was rising on another front. Randolph, ever 
the oppositionist, was aghast at both the Corrupt Bargain and the new 
administration’s agenda. Just after Congress convened in December 
1825, Randolph launched one of his classic tirades. At the end of a 
lengthy speech, he said the whole of his grievance stemmed from 
“the coalition of Blifil and Black George . . . the combination, un-
heard of till then, of the puritan with the blackleg.”63 The fallout from 
this speech included a duel between Randolph, Virginia’s most flam-
boyant politician, and Clay, the U.S. secretary of state. 
 It also engendered a firestorm of criticism of Calhoun. One critic, 
in an essay pseudonymously signed “Patrick Henry,” attacked him 
for sitting mute as Randolph digressed from the business at hand for 
hours at a time; his accuser also dredged up Calhoun’s behavior dur-
ing the Randolph-Dickerson affair. After all, Calhoun had said it 
was the senators’ purview to make points of order; why, then, had he 
interrup-ted Dickerson on his own? “Patrick Henry” concluded that 
Calhoun’s real intent was to let administration enemies animadvert to 
their hearts’ content. Randolph, for example, often digressed, yet 
Calhoun sat passively in what the critic called “a flagrant official 
non-feasance.” The Constitution made the vice president the Sen-
ate’s presiding officer; under Calhoun’s self-justificatory theory, if 
the Senate did not assign to him the power to preside, he did not have 
it. What kind of constitutionalism was that? Obviously, his power to 
squelch such as Randolph was inherent; the rules Calhoun had cited 
simply supplemented the office’s inherent power—they were not al-
ternatives to it. 
 “Patrick Henry” said that the vice presidency and the presidency 
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pro tempore were offices of different kinds. The Senate could abolish 
the latter at will, but the people had created the former. Thus, “Pat-
rick Henry” argued, Calhoun’s respect for the Senate was greater 
than his respect for the people; this made a mockery of Calhoun’s 
trumpeted respect for the majesty of the sovereign people. None of 
Calhoun’s predecessors had been so partial, not even Aaron Burr!64 
 For Calhoun, this offered a wonderful opportunity. First, Cal-
houn thought, as did many others, that “Patrick Henry” was President 
Adams himself.65 Second, the unpopularity that had resulted from the 
Corrupt Bargain was worsened by the proposals contained in President 
Adams’s first annual message. Although he had repeatedly said that 
Congress should not pursue any of his programs it believed to be 
prohibited by the Tenth Amendment, the knowledge that Adams was 
willing to propose such over-reaching in the first place had Republi-
cans in a lather.66 
 Calhoun’s initial response in the Senate came on May 18, 1826. 
In answer to a rhetorical dust-up, he said that he would only call to 
order when the Senate’s rules allowed. “The Chair had no authority 
but what was vested in the Chair by the rule of the Senate itself. . . . 
The Chair . . . would stand in the light of a usurper, were it to attempt 
to exercise such a power.”67 
 His next move was to enter the debate in print himself by assum-
ing as his nom de plume “Onslow,” the name of a famous Whig 
speaker of the House of Commons. In his first “Onslow” letter, Cal-
houn denied not only that he had the power to call senators to order 
“for words spoken in debate,” but that the words in question would 
have been subject to a point of order in any event. Never, in any Eng-
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lish-speaking legislative chamber, had it been out of order to call at-
tention to Executive corruption. Thus, to claim that the president and 
secretary of state had “formed a corrupt coalition” could not be im-
proper. Calhoun had been blamed for the Clay-Randolph duel, but it 
had been Randolph’s right to utter words which “nothing but a des-
potic Power, worse than the sedition law, could have prevented him 
from uttering!” As for the Dickerson episode, all debate had been 
out of order; a motion to table could be discussed, he said, only by 
the moving senator. 
 The rest of Calhoun’s article involved references to legal precedent 
similar to those employed by “Patrick Henry.” The consensus among 
historians is that this learned sparring was inconclusive. Nonetheless, 
“Onslow’s” legal arguments were probably more appealing as rhetoric, 
for his initial essay more closely resembled those of the 1770s; “Pat-
rick Henry’s” recalled the 1798 Federalist arguments, which, along 
with Adams’s parentage, helps explain “Onslow’s” reference to the 
Sedition Act. 
 The Senate majority apparently had not seen any problems with 
Calhoun’s attitude, for, while it returned committee appointment power 
to the president pro tempore, it did nothing to augment the vice 
president’s parliamentary power. Tellingly, not even the administra-
tion’s friends in the Senate had disputed Calhoun. Calhoun’s con-
struction of Senate rules and the Constitution limited his own pow-
ers. What harm could come of that? “Ought a debate, involving the 
conduct and motives of Executive officers, to be checked by the 
Chair, when every member of the Senate deems it to be in order?” 
“Patrick Henry’s” charge of ambition was an odd answer to a re-
fusal to grasp at power, “Onslow” said in closing.68 
 The exchange got Calhoun’s juices flowing. In a letter written 
shortly thereafter, he said, 
we are on the eve of a great political struggle, which the 
papers in the interest of Mr. Adams & Clay attribute to 
“factious opposition”; but which, if I do not greatly mis-
take, springs from causes far deeper. 
Echoing Madison’s “Publius” writings, Calhoun said that faction could 
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not long excite a large territory; only causes “such as in the opinion 
of the people are calculated to endanger liberty, or arrest the national 
prosperity” could do that. The people were right to be agitated, for “the 
liberty of this country was never in greater danger.” 
 Since the American Executive was unitary, only responsibility 
kept it in check. Clay’s move from the House to the Cabinet had im-
paired his popularity, as he must have expected. He must therefore 
have believed that offices would soon be more dependent on patron-
age than popularity, a deduction that the administration’s behavior 
reinforced. “The struggle, I do believe, is between liberty and 
power.” 
 As for himself, Calhoun thought he possessed the purity of the 
driven snow: 
In opposing the caucus, the choice of electors by State 
legislatures, the control of Juntos, or political leaders, I 
was actuated by the principles, that now guide me. It has 
ever been the object dearest to me to procure the ascen-
dancy of the popular voice in our system.69 
 His June 4, 1826, letter (headed “Private”) to Andrew Jackson 
addressed in the starkest terms the dichotomy represented by the ad-
ministration and its opponents: power versus liberty. Calhoun used 
such phrases as “liberty never was in greater danger,” “the power and 
patronage of the Executive, or the voice of the people,” and so on.70 
Clay and Adams (especially Clay) represented a factious cabal, a 
new Walpole ministry. If their system should become established, he-
reditary monarchy would not be far behind. Jackson was the hope of 
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the Republic, “under Providence,” to thwart the attempt. 
 “Patrick Henry” published his second missive on June 7, 1826. 
He had realized that “Onslow” was Calhoun, and addressed him thus.71 
Other than that, while he adduced new precedents in support of old 
arguments, there was little new in the letter. Calhoun’s question whe-
ther the vice president should be able to shut off Senate debate un-
friendly to the Executive—to the vice president, for example—was 
“vulgar rhetoric,” he argued. Calhoun’s feigned reluctance to grasp 
power reminded “Patrick Henry” of Caesar, Cromwell, and Burr. 
Of all the species of moderation in a public man, that 
which disclaims an authority delegated to him by the 
People for their own benefit, is the least entitled to ap-
plause, and the most obvious to suspicion.72 
 Calhoun saw “Patrick Henry’s” rhetoric, with its references to 
Jefferson as the “Sage of Monticello” (then seen as a slur), its allu-
sions to Milton, its reliance on Roman, to the exclusion of Greek, 
historical allusions, and other New England rhetorical devices as the 
idiom of a new faction whose appeal was to power, not virtue. This 
was the idiom, the mindset, that Calhoun would associate with the 
North ever after. To Virginia’s Senator Littleton Walker Tazewell, 
in the first of Calhoun’s published papers in which he places such 
reliance on the South, he wrote: 
I rejoice to learn, that Virginia is perfectly sound [that is, 
reliably anti-Adams]. . . . There can be no reaction in fa-
vour of liberty in the present state of our country, which 
does not come from the slave holding States, headed by 
Virginia and sustained by Pennsylvania. This the coali-
tion doubtless understand . . . [, so] I anticipate the renewal 
of the Missouri question. If I mistake not, it has already 
commenced. 
In an attempt to divide the opposition, one of Clay’s lieutenants in the 
House had referred to slavery in the District of Columbia as “the only 
form in which the question can be brought under discussion in Con-
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gress, free from decisive Constitutional objections.”73 
 Calhoun set his new line of thought before the public in 
“Onslow’s” June 27, 1826, letter. “Patrick Henry,” said “Onslow,” 
always favored concentrations of power “in the fewest and least re-
sponsible hands.” Why had he devoted so much attention to Senate 
rules and Parliamentary precedents when, in the end, he would rely 
on the vice president’s fiat? The Constitution explicitly gave the Sen-
ate the power to establish its own rules. How, then, could the vice 
president interrupt when senators did not want him to? “Whatever 
right the Vice-President possesses over order, must be derived from 
the Senate. . . . I affirm that, as a presiding officer, he has no inher-
ent power whatever.” 
 Calhoun had espied monarchical tendencies, and he meant for 
the public to notice them: 
There was a time when minions of power thought it 
monstrous, that all of the powers of rulers should be de-
rived from so low and filthy a source as the People 
whom they governed. “A deeper and holier foundation” 
[“Patrick Henry’s” words] of power was sought, and that 
was proclaimed to be in the “inherent” divine “right of 
rulers.” 
Further, he argued, inherent powers are powers that are necessary to 
the office; the fact that no other legislative president held this power 
inherently proved it was not essential to the office. 
 Calhoun did not think the driving motive of  “Patrick Henry’s” 
allies was to undermine public liberty; rather, he believed their thirst 
for the sweet nectar of emoluments and honorifics had led them to 
plot to retain office by corrupt means.74 Freedom of debate was the 
first bulwark against such men, and to do away with it would be to 
take a long step toward despotism. Restoration of party rivalry 
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(which Calhoun would ever oppose75) might return the vice presi-
dency to the president’s control, thus bringing Senate debate under the 
same control and “shielding his conduct from investigation”: “The 
Senate would speedily sink into a body to register the decrees of the 
President, and sing Hosannas in his praise, and be as degraded as the 
Roman Senate, under Nero.”76 
 “Onslow’s” earlier reference to the Sedition Act was calculated 
to bring to mind unhappy memories associated with President Ad-
ams’s family, an effort he repeated in his reference in his June 29 
letter to the attempt to make the common law part of federal law.77 
“Patrick Henry” had provided him ammunition via an assertion that 
rules of the House of Commons were binding in the Senate. 
“Onslow” scored additional rhetorical points by pointing out that in 
defending Dicker-son, “Patrick Henry” was standing up for a sena-
tor who was “not conscious of any injustice having been inflicted.” 
“Onslow’s” most powerful rhetorical move of the whole debate may 
have been in his answer to “Patrick Henry’s” complaint about Cal-
houn’s use of his power to assign senators to committees. Taking 
one committee at a time, “Onslow” defended each appointee to 
whose appointment “Patrick Henry” had objected by name. This 
was a rhetorical move “Patrick Henry” could not answer without of-
fending the senators in question and thereby damaging the Adams 
administration. 
 Randolph, “Onslow” continued, had been in Congress for a quar-
ter of a century. He had always been mercurial, always biting. Not 
once had any speaker of the House or vice president, including 
Henry Clay, interrupted him because of the nature of his statements. 
Randolph had been equally severe toward the three preceding presi-
dents; the novel element in the equation was that Adams and Clay 
did not intend to brook dissent.78 
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 “Patrick Henry” ultimately proved overmatched in the battle of 
wits. From that point on, he engaged mainly in a series of word games, 
verbal feints that could not possibly persuade the unpersuaded. His 
position was inherently unappealing: although he might attribute the 
delegation of power to the agency of the people, it appeared that he 
wanted that power to be essentially unaccountable. He had no answer 
to “Onslow’s” point about the possibility of presidential control over 
the vice president. 
 In his August 8, 1826, column, “Patrick Henry” took the unten-
able position that the administration had a right to expect each Sen-
ate committee to include a pro-administration majority. Calhoun’s 
appointments had been reflective of the Senate’s actual make-up, and 
that galled “Patrick Henry.”79 It is almost as if he wanted to lose the 
debate in the court of public opinion. “Onslow” would soon charac-
terize this notion as “not less slavish than absurd.”80 
 Finally, Calhoun settled on a basically sectional explanation of 
events. Clay was to blame for a resuscitation of the 1798–1800 contest; 
Adams, “like a ball on a plane, which may easily be moved in any 
direction,” was his dupe. The Federalists’ principles, though bad, had 
been better than the administration’s, which combined the personnel 
of “the old Federal party of ’98 and the barg[a]in and sale party of 
the West. That is the real union,” Calhoun wrote.81 The opposition 
resembled “Brutus, Cato, Hampden, Washington, and Jefferson.”82 
 As the debate raged, Calhoun’s assurance of victory over Adams 
and Clay, along with his confidence in his own and his section’s 
right-eousness, grew.83 So did his belief that grasping politicians 
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would attempt to drum up sectional animosity. Never had American 
institutions been so endangered, he argued, even in the days of Fed-
eralism; a loss in the 1828 election would leave the Executive pre-
dominant. Yet, the South, the nation’s hope, daily became more 
united; the Northern coalition could attempt to exploit the slave ques-
tion, but Pennsylvania would not be swayed; the opposition would tri-
umph.84 Calhoun’s growing sense that he and his friends would win 
led him to conclude his last “Onslow” letter with a challenge to 
“Patrick Henry”: why not debate the merits of Adams’s/Clay’s as-
cension, the principle of which would have legitimated the selection 
of Burr over Jefferson in the House in 1800? “Patrick Henry” never 
responded. 
 
PORK BARREL POLITICS AND SECTIONALISM 
 From Calhoun’s perspective, one of the most deleterious effects of 
Clay’s cabal on the American political system was its open promo-
tion of what we today call “pork barrel” politics. This tactic, Cal-
houn realized, was useful in building (corrupt) coalitions; it was also 
bound to have disparate effects, its beneficiaries being those parts of 
the country whose (corrupt) politicians played the game, and its vic-
tims those whose (virtuous) representatives refused. This problem 
haunted Cal-houn through the rest of his career.85 
 Since the growing popularity of General Jackson seemed des-
tined to put the problem to rest, Calhoun was temporarily at ease 
over the matter. Little did he know, however, that Jackson’s election 
would bring in its train the domination of Martin Van Buren’s De-
mocratic Party; indeed, Calhoun would one day see Van Buren as the 
ultimate spoilsman. For now, he could toast, “The Union of the States: 
                                                                                                            
Calhoun, vol. 10, pp. 237–38; Calhoun to Lt. James Colhoun, December 
24, 1826, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 10, pp. 238–40; Calhoun to 
Virgil Maxcy, January 14, 1827, The Papers of John C. Calhoun, vol. 10, 
pp. 251–52. 
84Calhoun to Bartlett Yancey, January 14, 1827, The Papers of John C. 
Cal-houn, vol. 10, pp. 252–53. 
85For the effects on Calhoun’s mature political theory, see Freehling, 
“Spoilsmen and Interests in the Thought and Career of John C. Calhoun,” 
pp. 25–42. In this, as in many other things, Calhoun came after 1824 to be 
firmly in the intellectual tradition of John Taylor of Caroline. 
Gutzman – Paul to Jeremiah: Calhoun’s Abandonment of National-
ism 
31 
 
Founded on the principles of Reason and Justice—its preservation 
requires an equal participation, in all parts, of its benefits and its 
burdens.”86 
 Calhoun increasingly believed that Madison had been wrong: ex-
tension of the sphere did not necessarily—by multiplying the inter-
ests vying for federal government favor—guarantee that no one in-
terest would ever face a hostile majority for long. When Pennsyl-
vania’s pro-tariff faction called a convention in Harrisburg in late 
1827, he wrote to Tazewell that the American Constitution protected 
“the constituents against rulers,” but did not provide for “the protec-
tion of one portion of the people against another.” What was being 
hatched in Harrisburg was a permanent, selfish taxation of one part 
of the country for the benefit of another—exactly what Calhoun’s 
1817 Bonus Bill had been intended to avert. “I deeply fear,” Cal-
houn continued, “that the simple alternative of submission, or resis-
tance will be presented to the oppressed.” 
 State veto and the repeal of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, which provided for appeal of state court decisions to the federal 
courts, were possible remedies;87 as it stood, the states had no check 
on federal government mis/malfeasance.88 Clay had conceived a 
system which the North and West would never have any (selfish) 
motive to abolish, leading Calhoun to write “Dissolution or tyran[n]y 
is approaching.”89 These views were not merely for public or political 
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consumption (Tazewell, recall, was a Virginia senator), for Calhoun 
repeated them in a letter to his nephew.90 
 Calhoun had long been concerned lest internal improvements de-
scend from national to local in benefit. Thus, from his position in the 
Monroe Cabinet, he had opposed federal support of intrastate im-
provements. This position was unaltered, perhaps strengthened, by 
his views of the Adams administration.91 The downturn in the South 
Carolina economy (which affected the Lord of Fort Hill as much as 
anyone) must have impressed upon Calhoun the urgency of the anti-
Adams cause.92 
 Calhoun’s opposition to the Adams administration should not be 
mistaken for opposition to the Union, however. When Dr. Cooper 
called for calculation of the Union’s value, Calhoun and, he guessed, 
the vast majority of Southerners, objected.93 Yet, he did note that 
Cooper’s talk could have a positive effect: it would probably make 
tariff proponents reconsider their position.94 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The Calhoun who wrote the “South Carolina Exposition” had 
much in common with the Calhoun who was a South Carolina War 
Hawk in 1812. Each was devoted to the American republic as he 
understood it. Each was ready to take bold, even reckless, steps as 
the situation demanded. Each was prone, as Henry Clay remarked, 
to see a crisis in situations which seemed much less dire to many of 
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his contemporaries. 
 In 1812, the “crisis” Calhoun addressed was that of the Union’s 
existence, of an external threat to the legacy of the Founding Fathers 
(including his own father). The events of 1824 raised in Calhoun’s 
mind the specter of a threat to the republic from within, of a new mode 
of politics threatening the Founders’ republicanism. After the “Cor-
rupt Bargain,” only the South seemed to have that old-time virtue. 
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